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Abstract 
Among studies on performance outcomes of entry mode choices disagreement fueled by 
ambiguous research findings is apparent as regards whether the best performers are those 
firms that enter foreign countries with high or low entry mode degree of control. To solve this 
dilemma and test new hypotheses, the relationship between entry mode degree of control and 
firm performance is examined by meta-analyzing 133 studies (740,114 observations) 
covering entry mode choices from 1980 to 2010. We find that (a) overall high-control entry 
modes lead to higher performance, and (b) adopting high-control entry modes is particularly 
important for firms entering developing countries.  
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1. Introduction 
“Researchers differ substantially in their findings with regard to the control structure–
performance link. […] Future research is encouraged to continue this path to uncover the 
situational factors that influence [this] relationship” (Ren, Gray, and Kim, 2009: 816-
817). 
 
Entry mode choice has been regarded by international management scholars as one of the 
most critical decisions in international expansion, with strong implications for firm 
performance. Research has expanded in the past three decades to explore performance 
outcomes in relation to the chosen entry mode (e.g., Brouthers, 2013; Gao, Pan, Lu, and Tao, 
2008; Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Killing, 1982; Ren, Gray, and Kim, 2009; Robson, 
Leonidou, and Katsikeas, 2002; Zeng, Shenkar, Song, and Lee, 2013). The ‘entry mode 
degree of control’—the extent to which a firm’s activities in the country where it entered are 
owned and directly managed by the firm itself (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Isobe, 
Makino, and Montogmery, 2000)—has been regarded as a key factor for the analysis of the 
entry mode choice’s performance outcome. The export of goods has the lowest degree of 
control; licenses and franchises provide a higher degree of control; equity-based entries, such 
as joint ventures and, in particular, wholly owned subsidiaries, afford the highest control 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Beamish, 1985; Johnson and Tellis, 2008; Li, 1995; Pan and 
Chi, 1999). Despite the growing popularity of studies on the relationship between entry mode 
degree of control and performance, various authors have noted that results derived from 
decades of research offer no clear consensus regarding the type of entry mode that gives 
firms the greatest performance advantage (Brouthers, 2013; Ren, Gray, and Kim, 2009). 
Whereas some studies have indicated a positive relationship between the entry mode degree 
of control and firm performance (e.g., Chatterjee, 1990; Johnson and Tellis, 2008), others 
have found either a negative relationship (e.g., Ma and Delios, 2007), or a not significant one 
(Tihanyi, Griffith, and Russell, 2005). This disagreement is not only fueled by ambiguous 
research findings, but also by the different theoretical perspectives used to explain the entry 
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mode degree of control–firm performance relationship, including but not limited to the 
transaction cost view, the resource-based view and the institution-based view. Moreover, 
interestingly, mixed arguments and results can be found also among different studies using 
the same theoretical lens (Zhao, Ma, and Yang, 2017). 
In light of these conflicting findings, the purpose of this study is two-fold. First, we aim at 
shedding new light on this research area with the help of meta-analytic techniques. As 
highlighted by Eden (2002), meta-analyses are useful in addressing open research questions 
with data that are closer to definitive than those reported in any single primary study. Our 
study thus begins with a meta-analytic review to examine the mixed empirical findings in the 
literature on the performance outcomes of entry mode degree of control decisions.  
Second, since both Eden (2002) and Combs, Ketchen, Crook, and Roth (2010) noted that 
meta-analyses are also a useful tool to extend existing theories, we also employ a set of more 
advanced meta-analytic techniques to evaluate hypotheses that go beyond the mere main 
effect of entry mode degree of control on firm performance, and that would be difficult to 
assess in single-sample primary studies. Our theory-extending hypotheses aims at exploring 
best performing entry mode decisions in developing countries, by bridging the “transaction 
cost analysis (Williamson, 1985), [that] is the most widely used theoretical perspective in 
environmental entry mode research” (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007: p. 400), with the 
institution-based view of strategies (e.g., Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers, 2002; 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009), that 
centers on how institutions in a firm’s host country affect entry mode decisions. Our study 
starts from Brouthers and colleagues’ observation (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 1999; 
Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Nakos, 2004) that each firm is likely to make a different 
entry mode choice because its traits are heterogeneous. In this view, we contend that the 
degree of control per se is not a valid predictor of firm entry mode performance, unless we 
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impose boundary conditions on the type of transaction costs firms would encounter when 
entering a certain type of countries. More specifically, our focus here is the uncertainties 
firms have to cope with when entering developing countries as opposed to developed 
countries. In fact, as developing countries fall short of effective market-supporting 
institutions, firms entering these markets face high costs and risks (Khanna and Palepu, 
2010). Our hypotheses point to the fact that firms are exposed to two contrasting forces when 
entering developing countries: the need to mitigate behavioral uncertainty and the need to 
mitigate environmental uncertainty. However, despite these uncertainties are both present in 
developing countries, the extant literature offers opposing prescriptions in terms of the entry 
mode degree of control a firm should use to cope with these uncertainties. Our meta-analytic 
review examines whether the priority to mitigate one type of uncertainty outweighs the other, 
and thus whether high- as opposed to low-control entry modes are preferable when firms 
enter developing countries (as opposed to developed ones). 
To tackle the two above-mentioned points, first, by using meta-analysis techniques, we 
assess the bivariate association of entry mode degree of control with firm performance 
relying on a relatively large sample of articles (i.e., 133 studies; total sample size of 740,114 
observations) published across a wide time period (i.e., from 1994 to 2014), and referring to a 
set of analyses conducted on a large time frame (i.e., 1980–2010) (see Appendix). This large 
time frame also allows examining the evolutionary dynamics of the relationship. Second, by 
means of meta-regression techniques, we test whether the entry mode degree of control–
performance relationship changes depending on the level of economic development of the 
host country, distinguishing between developing and developed countries.  
2. Theory Background and Hypotheses 
2.1. Main Effect of Entry Mode Degree of Control on Firm Performance: Competing 
Arguments and Theoretical Lenses 
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Opposing theoretical arguments suggest alternative performance outcomes as entry mode 
degree of control increases, and interestingly, mixed arguments and results can be found also 
among different studies using the same theoretical lens (Zhao, Ma, and Yang, 2017). We first 
start summarizing studies that provide support for a positive relationship between entry mode 
degree of control and performance, and later we will turn our attention to those offering 
support for a negative relationship. 
According to various resource-based view scholars, all the other things being equal, as the 
entry mode degree of control increases, the firm’s performance increases because it can 
deploy key resources that are essential to success (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Isobe, 
Makino, and Montgomery, 2000). These resources can be intangible assets, such as brand 
equity and marketing knowledge, or tangible assets, such as own sales force and retail chain. 
Control over such assets gives a firm a certain freedom in its deployment and offers the 
possibility of exploiting them to a greater extent, thus enhancing its chances of success 
(Johnson and Tellis, 2008). For example, Tang and Yu (1990) found that a wholly owned 
subsidiary is the optimal strategy because it generates the highest level of economic profit 
and maximizes control of critical knowledge indefinitely. Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino 
(1994) found that new venture direct investment and the joint venture mode outperform lower 
control entry modes because they help the firm to monitor success and failure closely. 
Likewise, other studies found support for a positive relationship between entry mode degree 
of control and performance, with the main explanation being that higher foreign ownership 
level brings in more advanced foreign technology and thus leads to higher productivity (e.g., 
Anand and Delios, 1997; Delios and Beamish, 2004). 
While resource-based view studies on entry mode choices focus on how entry mode 
decisions can optimize the use of resources in the host country, the transaction cost 
perspective describes the entry mode choice as a critical decision of governance and 
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recommends an entry mode that can minimize the costs associated with governing and 
monitoring transactions (Beamish and Kachra, 2004; Brouthers, 2002; Chung and Beamish, 
2012). Among those studies drawing on the transaction cost view, some found a positive 
relationship between entry mode degree of control and firm performance, with the main 
explanations being that the need of greater control results in higher investment in intangible 
and tangible resources, fast decision making, and better control over partners in the host 
country (e.g., Chang et al., 2013).  
Other scholars explained the entry mode-performance relationship using the ‘OLI’ or 
‘eclectic’ approach to the study of foreign direct investment (FDI), initially developed by 
John Dunning (Dunning, 1977). ‘OLI’ stands for Ownership, Location, and Internalization, 
three potential sources of advantage for a firm that wants to become a multinational. 
Ownership advantages suggests that a successful MNE has some firm-specific advantages 
which allow it to overcome the costs of operating in a foreign country. Location advantages 
refer to the benefits of where an MNE chooses to locate its business functions. Finally, 
internalization advantages refer to entry modes choices, trading off the savings in 
transactions, holdup and monitoring costs of high-control entry modes, against the 
advantages of low-control entry strategies. By drawing on the OLI framework, some authors 
found support for a positive relationship between entry mode degree of control and firm 
performance, with the main explanation being that international acquisitions (i.e., high 
control), as opposed to export, franchising and other forms of entry decisions with lower 
control, allow firms to obtain three broad types of benefit: operational, strategic and financial 
benefits (Markides and Ittner, 1994). 
Finally, also some studies using the institution-based view of strategy have found a 
positive relationship between entry mode degree of control and performance. One of the 
arguments used here is that having high control over partners in the host country helps the 
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entrant firm shorten the time it takes to establish legitimacy in the local institutional 
environment, that in turn positively affects the foreign subsidiary growth and survival (e.g., 
Lu and Xu, 2006). 
In light of the above-mentioned studies, we should expect that: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between a firm’s entry mode degree of 
control and its performance.  
Interestingly, some of the above-mentioned theories used to explain a positive 
relationship between entry mode degree of control and performance, have been used by other 
authors to explain a negative relationship. For example, various studies drawing on the 
resource-based view found support for a negative relationship between entry mode degree of 
control and performance, with the main explanations being that lower control entry modes 
are better than high-control modes because low-control modes are relatively easier to access 
resources like cheaper labor and material (e.g., Luo, 1997). 
Also among studies drawing on the transaction cost view, some scholars have suggested 
that, all the other things being equal, increasing control of entry mode leads to higher costs, 
and control is inextricably linked to commitment (Luo, 2001). In other words, the higher the 
resource commitment and desired control of an entry mode, the higher are the costs the 
entrant has to bear (Johnson and Tellis, 2008). An export strategy is a low-cost entry mode 
because of the relatively lower level of resource commitment needed to market products in 
the foreign country. Wholly owned subsidiary is a high-cost entry mode because of the level 
of resource commitment needed to set up operations (Pan and Chi, 1999). High-cost (and 
then control) entry modes (1) imply that higher levels of investments are needed to break 
even and make a profit (Johnson and Tellis, 2008), and, at the same time, (2) offer the firm 
lower strategic flexibility, i.e. the firm’s ability to rapidly redeploy assets from the host 
country or adapt its asserts to the changing environments if situation so dictates (Brouthers 
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and Nakos, 2004), two factors that are likely to amplify sunk costs in case the firm terminates 
investments in the host country (Brouthers, 2002; Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998).  
Finally, also some studies using the institution-based view of strategy have found a 
negative relationship between entry mode degree of control and performance. One of the 
arguments used here is that for the entrant firm it is particularly important to meet the 
demands of the local institutional environment, which can be accomplished best by leaving 
high discretionary power to the local partner in the host country. In fact, “local partners, 
though likely to be small and resource poor, still may have advantageous locations and a 
developed logistics network, which suggests a physical competitive advantage” (Magnusson 
et al. 2009: 29). 
In light of the above-mentioned studies, we should expect that: 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between a firm’s entry mode degree of 
control and its performance.  
2.2. Bridging Transaction Cost View and Institution-based View to Explain 
Performance of Entry Mode Degree of Control in Developing Countries 
Brouthers and colleagues (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 1999; Brouthers, 2002; 
Brouthers and Nakos, 2004) have attempted to explain the mixed results in the entry mode-
performance literature by suggesting that, since firms self-select strategic choices that they 
expect will yield the best performance, and this self-selection is not one-size fits all, each 
firm is likely to make a different choice because its traits are heterogeneous. Therefore, there 
is a self-selection bias in the sense that firms will select the optimal entry mode choice 
reflecting a variety of internal and external factors. The authors also propose that “instead of 
examining performance differences for different entry mode types, researchers should focus 
on how contingency model–based (for example transaction cost–based) mode of entry 
choices may differ in performance from non-contingency model–based mode choices.” 
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(Brouthers and Nakos, 2004: p. 235). That is because, if firms make entry mode choices 
consistent with (e.g., transaction cost) theory (i.e., optimal choices) there should be no 
systematic difference in performance implications of entry mode choices. At the same time, 
mode choices that are consistent with theory outperform those that are not (Brouthers, 2002). 
In view of Brouthers and colleagues’ argument, we contend that the degree of control per 
se is not a valid predictor of firm entry mode performance, unless we impose boundary 
conditions on the type of transaction costs firms would encounter when entering a certain 
type of countries. This is consistent with the institution-based view of entry mode choices, as 
it suggests that a country’s institutional environment affects firm entry mode choices, and in 
turn also performance outcomes (e.g., Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers, 2002; 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009; Pan, 
2002; Slangen, 2013; Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). More specifically, our focus here is the 
uncertainties firms have to cope with when entering developing countries as opposed to 
developed countries. In fact, although firms operating in foreign markets encounter different 
institutional environments which present diverse challenges to them than in their home 
markets, when firms operate in developed countries they rely on well established market-
supporting institutions such as specialized market intermediaries, regulatory systems and 
contract-enforcing mechanisms (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, 2005) to function. However, the 
story is very different when firms decide to enter into developing countries. Unlike in 
developed countries, developing markets lack some of these market-supporting institutions, 
thus forcing foreign entrants to cope with institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). And 
although developing countries may have differences in how they challenge entrant firms, 
because of the lack of reliable market institutions they all force entrant firms to cope with 
uncertainties. As noted by Khanna and Palepu (1997: p. 41): “Emerging markets are hardly 
uniform. Nevertheless, they all fall short to varying degrees in providing the institutions 
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necessary to support basic business operations.” We thus ask: how does the host country level 
of economic development affect the relationship between a firm’s entry mode degree of 
control and its performance? 
Transaction cost scholars have discussed about two main types of uncertainty that 
generate transaction costs for entrant firms: behavioral and environmental uncertainty. 
Behavioral uncertainty arises from the inability of a firm to predict the behavior of partners 
in a foreign country (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Chiao, Yu, and Peng, 2009). For 
example, in certain countries it is difficult to write complete contracts to discipline the entrant 
and host country partner relationship (Brouthers, 2002). Environmental uncertainty refers to 
the inability of a firm to predict future events, often resulting from the volatility of 
environmental conditions in a host country (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers and 
Hennart, 2007; Jiang, Beamish, and Makino, 2014). For example, local authorities in the host 
country may suddenly create barriers to entry that restrict the entrant firm’s actions, access to 
resources, or impose restrictions on the foreign transfer of goods (Delios and Beamish, 1999). 
Because of the lack of reliable market institutions in developing countries, the institution-
based view of entry mode choices (e.g., Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009) suggests 
that these two types of uncertainty are particularly evident in developing countries (as 
opposed to developed countries). Reliable institutions instead, as the ones we find in 
developed economies, reduce the transaction costs triggered by behavioral and environmental 
uncertainty and establish a stable structure that facilitates interactions between entrant firms 
and actors in the host country. 
Although firms entering developing countries have to simultaneously cope with these two 
types of uncertainty, transaction cost theory offers different predictions about the type of 
control a firm’s entry modes should have when these uncertainties are present in the host 
country. Authors suggest that in the presence of behavioral uncertainty firms should use high-
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control entry modes to avoid foreign partners opportunism (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988), 
while in the presence of environmental uncertainty firms should use low control entry modes 
to retain strategic flexibility necessary to rapidly withdraw assets from the host country if 
situation so dictates (Brouthers and Nakos, 2004). Since both types of uncertainties are 
present in developing countries, this means entrant firms have to choose entry modes based 
on opposing theoretical recommendations. For this reason, we expect firms are likely to make 
mistakes in selecting the best performing entry modes, i.e. mode choices that are consistent 
with theory (Brouthers, 2002). E.g., those firms attempting to reduce transaction costs due to 
behavioral uncertainty might ignore transaction costs due to environmental uncertainty, and 
vice versa. In this vein, our analysis challenges the assumption that firms on average select 
modes that result in the greatest expected return and shows that firms frequently do not make 
such optimal choices. In what follows, by bridging transaction cost view and institution-
based view, we thus develop competing hypotheses on the performance implications of entry 
mode degree of control in developing countries as opposed to developed countries.  
2.2.1. The role of behavioral uncertainty 
Various authors from the transaction cost literature suggest that controlling partner 
organizations increases costs associated with monitoring partner behavior (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Stevens and Makarius, 2015). One way to control opportunistic behavior is 
to write more complete contracts. However, contracts are costly to write and enforce and, 
because of bounded rationality, writing complete contracts is not possible (Williamson, 
1985). Hence increased transaction costs related to behavioral uncertainties lead firms to 
internalize activities (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1991). 
Since behavioral uncertainty is likely to be particularly high for firms entering developing 
countries (as opposed to developed countries), we should expect entry modes with high 
degree of control to be particularly appropriate to enter these countries. More specifically, 
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when entering developing countries, high-control entry modes may limit behavioral 
uncertainty providing two main benefits. First, high control helps the firm to safeguard key 
resources from leakage, limiting the opportunistic behaviors of partners in the host country 
(Johnson and Tellis, 2008). In fact, venturing into developing countries exposes firms of all 
size to additional challenges of know-how protection, since institutional distance may 
increase the likelihood of exposure to the opportunistic behavior of foreign partners. To 
minimize opportunistic behavior that might constrain the effectiveness of competitive 
actions, firms need to establish specific control mechanisms (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Klein, Frazier, and Roth, 1990). As suggested by various scholars, since developing countries 
are often characterized by underdeveloped capital markets, a scarcity of skilled labor, and a 
lack of reliable market information, business success rests in a firm's ability to acquire and 
secure scarce resources (Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008). Guillen (2000), for example, found that 
the direct control of resources in China enables foreign entrants to gain a resource advantage 
including securing technology and know-how.  
Second, control allows for internal operational control (e.g., activities aimed to ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of financial reporting, the 
compliance with laws and regulations), which is essential to mitigate differences in cultural 
values between firms’ employees in domestic and foreign operations. It allows the entering 
firm to closely monitor both its developing country-based operations and consumers’ 
behavior (Luo, 2001), and to change easily marketing actions according to foreign consumer 
needs, without being constrained by the foreign partner action timing (Johnson and Tellis, 
2008). Li (2005), for example, found that high-control entry modes in China enable a firm to 
obtain a resource advantage, including establishing plants, hiring and training workers, all 
key assets for enhancing performance, given the underdeveloped education infrastructures 
and difficulties of finding skilled local employees.  
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Following the arguments of Brouthers and colleagues (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 
1999; Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Nakos, 2004), we should expect that firms that use 
high-control modes of entry when transaction cost theory predicts high-control modes of 
entry should be used, will perform better than firms using low control modes. Since, as 
discussed above, authors suggest that when behavioral uncertainty is high, high-control entry 
mode are preferable, given the high behavioral uncertainty in developing countries and the 
relatively lower behavioral uncertainty in developed countries, we should expect firms will 
increase their performance by using high-control entry modes when entering in developing 
countries (as opposed to developed countries). Therefore we posit: 
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between entry mode degree of control and 
performance is more positive (or less negative) for firms entering developing 
countries (as opposed to those entering developed countries). 
2.2.2. The role of environmental uncertainty 
One of the key arguments proposed by institutional theorists who study entry mode choices is 
that in certain environments, like those in developing countries (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), a 
lack of reliable market information, efficient intermediary institutions, predictable 
government actions, and an efficient bureaucracy constrain the ability of entrant firms to 
predict the likely outcome of their strategic actions (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, and 
Svobodina, 2004; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000). This environmental uncertainty 
translates in high investment risks for potential entrants that in turn may influence the choice 
about the entry mode degree of control. 
Some transaction cost scholars propose that when environmental uncertainty is high, as in 
developing economies, low-control entry modes might be preferable. The reason is that, since 
when environmental uncertainty in the host country is high there is a higher risk the 
investment project will not be successful, low or shared commitment will reduce risk 
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exposure (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Thus, “[…] uncertainty encourages firms to 
maintain flexibility and, hence, to choose market rather than hierarchical governance” 
(Brouthers and Hennart, 2007: p. 403). That is, if the environment in the developing country 
worsens and the firm decides to exit the market, the sunk costs incurred from terminating an 
export strategy or a contractual agreement will be less substantial than those from ceasing a 
wholly owned subsidiary (Hennart, 1988; Robson, Leonidou, and Katsikeas, 2002). For 
example, Giachetti (2016), in his study of Italian firms competing in the Chinese market 
during the 2000s, has shown that, given the high environmental uncertainty that Italian firms 
experienced when entering China, those firms with an aggressive strategic posture were 
better off when selecting non-equity, low-investment entry modes. In this way, they could 
relatively easily switch partner organizations or exit the market entirely if necessary, as well 
as rapidly adapt resources required to pursue competitive attacks to rivals if the situation so 
dictated. 
Following Brouthers and colleagues’ argument (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 1999; 
Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Nakos, 2004), we should expect that firms that use low 
control modes of entry when transaction cost theory predicts low control modes of entry 
should be used, will perform better than firms using high-control modes. Since authors 
suggest that when environmental uncertainty is high, low control entry mode are preferable 
(e.g., Brouthers and Nakos, 2004), given the high environmental uncertainty in developing 
countries as opposed to developed countries, we should expect firms will increase their 
performance by using low control entry modes when entering in developing countries (as 
opposed to developed countries). Therefore we posit: 
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between entry mode degree of control and 
performance is more negative (or less positive) for firms entering developing 
countries (as opposed to those entering developed countries). 
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3. Meta-analytical Methods  
3.1. Procedure  
This study employs meta-analytical methods to synthesize quantitatively existing empirical 
studies on the relationship between entry mode degree of control and firm performance. In 
general, meta-analysis is aimed at aggregating ‘effect sizes’ collected from a sample of 
studies. An example of effect size is the magnitude and sign of a correlation coefficient 
concerning a relationship of interest (Hunter and Schmidt, 2014). As noted by various 
scholars (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, and Cunha, 2009), it has 
become increasingly popular in management research to quantitatively integrate research 
findings across a large number of studies to examine whether there are prevailing 
relationships among a set of variables. 
Even though most studies assessing the entry mode degree of control–performance 
relationship have used multiple linear models, regression slopes and intercepts often cannot 
be meaningfully accumulated in a meta-analysis, as they could not be comparable across 
studies. In fact, even if significant steps have been taken in the last years to produce reliable 
techniques to synthesize slopes from complex models like structural equations and 
hierarchical models and to transform them in a common scale, there is a lack of shared 
knowledge among researchers in such cases. Moreover, differences in model specification 
may affect the reliability of the combining methods, and, even though meta-regression is one 
of the possible remedies to mitigate those variables which contribute most to this 
misspecification or alter an underlying relationship, problems related to the heterogeneity of 
the models used in the studies or their misspecification can alter the results (Becker and Wu, 
2007). For these reasons, we used the r-statistic, namely, the Pearson's product-moment 
correlation, representing a standardized measure of association between continuous variables 
17 
 
(Becker and Wu, 2007; Glass, McGaw, and Smith, 1981; Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson, 
1982).  
More specifically, in order to test our Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the pooling exercise to meta-
analyze the correlation coefficients of the entry mode degree of control–performance 
relationship was performed through a random-effects (as opposed to a fixed-effects) analysis 
since our sampled studies were performed in multiple contexts with different settings, and 
therefore studies were not to be considered functionally equivalent (Borenstein et al., 2007). 
We proceeded as follows. First, each 𝑟! was converted into a Fisher-transformed z score: 
(1)   𝑧! = !! 𝑙𝑛 !!!!!!!! , 
which has an approximate normal distribution with standard error 𝑆𝐸 𝑧! = !!!!! , being 𝑛! 
the sample size in study i. Second, each computed 𝑧! was averaged across studies with weight 𝑤! equal to: 
(2)  𝑤! = !!" !! !!  
where 𝑣 is the estimated random-effect variance (Field, 2001; Hedges and Olkin, 1985). 
The final average 𝑧  was obtained as follows: 
(3)   𝑧 = !!!!!!  
After this pooling exercise, 𝑧  was finally transformed back to a pooled 𝑟.  
As for the analysis of the test of our competing hypotheses related to the moderating 
effect of the host country degree of development on the relationship between entry mode 
degree of control and firm performance (i.e., Hypotheses 2a and 2b), we used a standard 
meta-regression model as follows (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989): 
(4)  𝑏! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐷!"!!!! + 𝜀!  
where 𝑏! is the effects size in study i (i = 1,…, n), 𝐷!" are K variables for study 
characteristics, and 𝜀! is an error term. In our case, 𝑏! is the zero-order correlation coefficient 
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found in study i. 
3.2. Sampling  
The authors independently performed the searching exercise. In order to obtain the final set 
of studies to be included in the meta-analysis, multiple and complementary search strategies 
were used. First, six electronic databases were examined – (1) Business Source Complete, (2) 
EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, (5) Science Direct, and (6) SSRN—using the 
following search terms: ‘entry mode’, ‘control’, ‘developing country/economy/market’, 
‘emerging country/economy/market’,1 ‘ownership’, ‘performance’. Second, the most relevant 
journals in the fields of accounting, economics, entrepreneurship, finance, and management 
were manually searched. Third, after collecting an initial set of studies, a two-way 
‘snowballing’ technique involving backward tracing all references reported in the selected 
articles and forward tracing all the articles that cited the selected articles was used. Google 
Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge were the bibliometric databases used (Van Hessen, Van 
Oosterhout, and Carneyet, 2012).  
Several decision rules to determine whether a study could be included in the meta-
analysis were used. First, since usable studies needed to report correlation coefficients, 
qualitative research, such as case studies, was not considered, as well as those empirical 
studies not presenting the correlation matrix (e.g., Woodcock, Beamish and Makino, 1994). 
Second, if one quantitative study used multiple yet separate sets of samples, each individual 
correlation coefficient was included as a separate unit of analysis (e.g., Zeng, Shenkar, Song, 
and Lee, 2013). This is because each correlation coefficient obtained from an independent 
estimation model represents a unique relationship with that dependent variable. Thus, each 
pairwise relationship was treated as an observed coefficient used in the meta-analysis. Third, 
                                                
1 As we will explain later when describing the variables used in our model, the meta-regression analysis was 
initially performed using the terms ‘developing’ and ‘emerging’ as synonyms. Subsequently, as a robustness 
check, we created a sub-sample including only studies considering entries in ‘emerging countries’, defined as 
those developing countries that have some characteristics of developed countries but do not meet standards to be 
developed. 
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since the hypotheses and empirical analysis in our study assume causality between entry 
mode degree of control (the driver) and firm performance (the outcome), the former variable 
needs to be measured at a time unit (e.g., year) preceding the latter variable, or they need to 
be computed at least in the same time unit. Therefore, (the two) studies with performance 
variables computed prior to the firm entry in the host country were excluded (e.g., Claver and 
Quer, 2005). Fourth, if we found the same authors used the same database and variables 
measurement in multiple articles, information on only one of these articles was considered 
(e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997, 1998). 
This process yielded 133 studies with a total of 136 observed coefficients (i.e., effect 
sizes) to be included in the meta-analysis. The total sample size consisted of 740,114 entry 
mode choices. The Appendix provides the list of studies included in the analysis.  
3.3. Variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, the sampled studies had to provide information on two key 
elements to be used in our analysis: (1) the correlation between entry mode degree of control 
and firm performance (entry control performance), and (2) the degree of development of the 
host country, i.e. developing vs. developed (developing country). The correlation between the 
entry mode degree of control and firm performance, i.e. the r-statistic, will be our dependent 
variable when running the meta-regression. The degree of development of the host country 
was instead used as a moderating factor of the entry mode degree of control–performance 
relationship, and thus to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
From our sampled studies, we identified four types of measurements of entry mode 
performance, synthesized in Table 1.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
As regards the variable entry mode degree of control, sampled studies have used two 
measures: (1) percent of equity ownership of the foreign partner (EM perc equity) and, (2) 
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type of entry mode, in the form of dummy (1 = entry mode with the higher degree of control) 
or ordinal (from lower to higher control) variable (EM type). Table 2 shows the number of 
studies per measure type. In our analysis of the relationship between entry mode degree of 
control and performance, we relied both on a ‘full sample’ including studies using both 
measures of entry mode degree of control, and two separate sub-samples each including 
observations related to only one of the two measures of entry mode degree of control. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
As regards the degree of development of the host country (developing country), we 
distinguished between developed and developing countries with a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 when the entry mode–performance relationship refers to firms entering a developing 
country or a set of developing countries (but not one or more developed countries) and 0 
otherwise. In order to define whether a country was a developing or a developed one, when 
available we referred to the definition provided by the authors of the sampled papers. In the 
few cases where the authors did not explicitly distinguished between developing and 
developed countries, we referred to the country classifications proposed by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, by considering the status of the country at the time the 
study was accomplished. Moreover, although the traditional developed/developing country 
dichotomy has been for decades the most common way to classify countries, over the last 
decades, given the level of heterogeneity within developing countries, other taxonomies have 
emerged. More specifically, various international organizations and financial institutions 
have agreed in classifying as ‘emerging countries/economies/markets’ those developing 
countries that have some characteristics of developed countries but do not meet standards to 
be developed. ‘Newly industrialized countries’ has also been used as synonym of emerging 
countries. For example, in 2014, the end of our data collection period, a list of emerging 
countries is the following: China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, 
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South Africa, Mexico and Turkey.2 As a robustness test we thus created also a variable 
emerging country to use as a substitute of developing country.3 
Information about various control variables was collected for mainly two purposes. First, 
we wanted to check whether the results of our meta-analysis were confirmed also in sub-
samples of our studies. Second, we wanted to take into account the role of other regressors 
potentially explaining the entry mode-performance relationship when testing meta-regression 
models. We used the following control variables (whose use and effect will be examined in 
the next sections): (i) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the study attempted to test and 
correct for endogeneity problems (Endogeneity); (ii) a set of dummy variables that take value 
1 if a specific theoretical lens (e.g., TCV or RBV), or a set of theories (Multiple theories), was 
used in the paper to explain the relationship between entry mode degree of control and firm 
performance;4 (iii) a set of variables indicating the quality of the journal where the sampled 
study was published, like the impact factor (at the year 2013) – using the threshold ‘2’ for 
distinguishing higher vs lower impact factor (IF) – and the International Scientific Indexing 
(ISI); (iv) a set of dummy variables indicating whether study i used as firm performance 
variable the duration (survival analysis) of the venture in the host country (Survival), 
financial outcomes (Financial), market outcomes (Market) or some sort of satisfaction 
indicator obtained through responses in a satisfaction questionnaire (Satisfaction). It is worth 
noting that the four types of performance are not mutually exclusive, since some authors used 
more measures of performance within the same study.5 Finally, we included a set of controls 
at the firm-level, each of them measured by the average value of firm-level characteristics we 
                                                
2 Interestingly, 39 out of 133 of our sampled studies considered only China as the host country of entry 
initiatives. This is a relevant number, and suggests a particular interest in modes that better perform to enter this 
country.  
3 The variable emerging countries takes value 1 if the host country is an emerging country or set of emerging 
countries but not one or more developing or developed countries, and 0 otherwise. 
4 It is worth noting that in various studies entry mode and/or firm performance were used as control variables, 
and thus no hypothesis was posited on their relationship. 
5 The dummy Survival was dropped in all meta-regression models because of multicollinearity. 
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collected from the descriptive statistics tables of our sampled studies. More specifically, we 
controlled for: (v) firm age, always measured with number of years since a firm’s founding;6 
(vi) firm size, measured in many different ways, like revenue, total assets, number of 
employees, and market capitalization. As for firm size, we used the European Commission’s 
(2015) criterion to classify firms based on their size, and then created four dummy variables, 
one per each size range, distinguishing between micro, small, medium and large enterprises.   
Tables 3 and 4 contain descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables used in our 
analysis. For example, Table 3 shows that the magnitude of the average correlation 
coefficient between entry mode degree of control and performance (entry control 
performance) in the full sample is 0.048 with a range from -0.16 to 0.386, whereas the 
variable developing country has a mean value of 0.434, meaning that in nearly half of our 
studies data referred to firms entering developing countries (as opposed to developed ones). 
----------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
----------------------------- 
4. Results 
4.1. Entry Mode Degree of Control and Firm Performance 
In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we need to meta-analyze the correlation between the 
two variables. Moreover, the obtained output will be the dependent variable in our meta-
regression. Since the sampled studies in our analysis are often heterogeneous in terms of 
various factors, like the measure of entry mode degree of control and performance, the 
observation period and the journal where the analysis was published, as a first step we 
examined the entry mode degree of control–performance relationship from different 
perspectives. 
                                                
6 In those papers where firm age was measured with the natural logarithm of the number of years, we 
transformed it into years. 
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First, Table 5 shows the results of the pooled correlation for the whole sample (136 
correlation coefficients) and for sub-samples based on type of performance measurement, 
entry mode measurement, journal characteristics, such as the ISI index and Impact Factor 
index (De Battisti and Salini, 2013), the prevailing theoretical lens used to explain the entry 
mode-performance relationship, as well as the year of survey. The pooled correlation for the 
whole sample is positive and significant (r = 0.045, p<001), with 𝐼! heterogeneity statistics 
equal to 93.8 percent for the full sample and ranging from 79.5 percent to 95.2 percent for 
sub-samples. Heterogeneity is, therefore, well present among the studies. This can be related 
to the high number of studies included in the meta-analysis, but it might not be necessarily a 
problem per se, since diversity is the norm and inevitable in meta-analyses conducted in the 
field of social science (Higgins et al., 2003). Interestingly, results are consistent also in all the 
various sub-samples, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1a and not Hypothesis 1b. For example, 
regardless the measure of performance used in the study (i.e., sub-samples 1-5), the measure 
of entry mode degree of control (i.e., sub-samples 6-7), and the theory used to explain the 
relationship (i.e., sub-samples 11-15), the relationship between entry mode degree of control 
and performance was always positive and significant. Moreover, the relationship was more 
positive and significant in studies published in journals with high impact factor (i.e., IF > 2), 
while only marginally significant in studies published in journals with lower impact factor 
(i.e., IF < 2).    
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------- 
4.2. Entry Model Degree of Control and Firm Performance in Developing Countries 
As explained before, to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we run a meta-regression that has as 
dependent variable entry control performance and as independent variables developing 
country plus various controls. Table 6 shows the regression results. Model 1 includes only 
controls, and in particular a selection of those control variables that were available in all 136 
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sampled studies (i.e., Endogeneity and the various dummies related to firm performance). In 
Model 2 developing country was added. In Model 3 the variable emerging country is used 
instead of the variable developing country. Each of the three regression models (Model 1-3) 
was estimated in three different samples, based on how the entry mode degree of control 
variable was measured in the sampled studies: (1) a full sample including studies using one or 
the other measure of entry mode degree of control, and the two sub-samples (2) one including 
studies using only EM perc equity, (3) and one including studies using only EM type. In 
Table 7 (Models 4-7) we repeat the analysis in Table 6 but adding one-by-one also those 
control variables that were available in only a subset of our sampled studies, like firm age and 
firm size.7  
Before we turn to a discussion of the coefficients of our key independent variables related 
to the presented hypotheses, we briefly examine the coefficients of the control variables. 
First, as shown in Models 2 and 3 (Table 6), the variable Endogeneity turns out to be positive 
and significant in two out of three samples (i.e., Full sample, EM perc equity), suggesting 
that those studies that tackled the endogeneity problem found that entry mode degree of 
control has a stronger and more significant effect on firm performance. Interestingly, if one 
would assume these studies to be more reliable, this finding would offer further support for 
Hypothesis 1a. Second, in Models 2 and 3 performance dummies are often not significance 
(in 16 out of 18 cases), suggesting there is not a particular performance dimension affecting 
the significance of the entry mode-performance relationship. As for the inclusion of the 
additional controls presented in Table 7, we found none of them to be significant in the 
various models presented (with few exceptions), suggesting that firm age and size do not 
significantly affect the way firms are able to obtain higher or lower performance when 
increasing their entry mode degree of control in the host countries. 
                                                
7 These controls were added one-by-one in order to not reduce too much the number of observations in the 
meta-regression models. 
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We now turn our attention to the hypotheses tests. With Hypothesis 2a we posited that 
when firms enter developing countries (as opposed to developed countries), they obtain 
higher performance if adopting entry modes with high degree of control, while with 
Hypothesis 2b we posited that firms obtain higher performance when they enter developing 
countries with low entry mode degree of control. As can be observed in Model 2 (Table 6), 
the coefficient of developing country is positive and significant when considering (a) the full 
sample (β =0.039, p < 0.01) and (b) studies using only EM perc equity as a measure of entry 
mode degree of control (β = 0.066, p < 0.05). However, it is not significant when considering 
studies using only EM type (β = 0.039, p > 0.1). These results overall support Hypothesis 2a 
and not Hypothesis 2b. Interestingly, the positive effect of the host country level of economic 
development is supported also in Model 3 when we consider the subsample of emerging 
countries. These findings were supported also in Table 7: as can be observed, coefficients of 
the variables developing country and emerging country are positive and significant in at least 
two out of three samples (i.e., Full sample, EM perc equity, EM type).  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 and 7 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
4.3. Meta-analysis Validity Checks 
We analyzed the validity of our meta-analysis looking at corrections for study artifacts, 
which might affect our findings. We were primarily concerned with those artifacts which are 
considered the most important in the literature, namely (1) the sampling error variance, (2) 
the reliability of the measurements used in the studies and (3) the range variation across 
studies (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein, 2009; Hunter and Schmidt, 2014).  
Sampling error is a non-systematic error, which almost always affects the study validity. 
Since ‘study validity will vary randomly from the population value because of sampling 
error’ (Hunter and Schmidt, 2014: p. 76), the sampling error variance is an important factor 
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which adds to the overall variance of the effect sizes (in our case ‘correlations’) across 
studies. For correlations, the sampling error variance estimate can be expressed as follows 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2014): 
(5)  𝜎!! = !!!! !!!!  
where 𝑟 is the pooled (untransformed) correlation coefficient, and 𝑛 = !!!!!!!  is the average 
study size. In our meta-analysis the proportion of variance due to sampling error compared to 
the total observed variance was relatively small (i.e., 6.6%), suggesting that the presented 
model is appropriate.  
As for the reliability of measurements and range restriction, which are also considered 
important in the literature, we were unable to collect sufficient information from the sampled 
studies to obtain the evaluation of these artifacts. Only one in twenty studies reported some 
sort of measurement of reliability, making impossible the estimates of missing values, 
whereas for range restriction the nature of the dependent variable (in most cases categorical 
or even dichotomous) and the absence of any restriction in study samples does not allow for 
any evaluation. 
Finally, since, as discussed in the introduction section, in existing studies on performance 
outcomes of entry mode choices there might be a ‘self-selection’ bias in the sense that firms 
select the optimal entry mode choice reflecting a variety of transaction cost factors, 
endogeneity problems might affect the results of our meta-analyses. More specifically, when 
assessing the relationship between entry mode and performance, endogeneity could be an 
issue for bias in the estimates if the entry mode choice is selected according to firms’ 
attributes and industry conditions (Shaver, 1998). We tried to account for endogeneity by 
searching for variables expressing ‘self-selection’ in the choice of the type of entry mode 
(e.g., industry growth, concentration in firm’s economic sector, number of other subsidiaries 
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in host country, R&D intensity, etc.), but very few of the selected papers included these 
variables in their empirical analysis or checked for the presence of endogeneity, thus 
constraining our goal of addressing this issue in our meta-analyses. 
5. Additional Analyses: Testing How the Entry Mode Degree of Control–Firm 
Performance Relationship Changes Over Time 
Although not directly predicted by our hypotheses, given the longitudinal nature of our 
sample, we wanted to check whether our predicted relationships changed over time, and try 
to give some explanation as to why they might significantly change. As noted by Zhao et al. 
(2017: 678) “future research should consider the temporal dimension of entry mode–
performance relationships. […] Although time is an important consideration in nearly every 
aspect of IB research, it is absolutely essential to entry–performance. The static approach 
relying heavily on cross-sectional data in the current literature can only offer a partial picture 
of a dynamic entry mode–performance relationship”. For example, we could reasonably 
assume that the macro-economic environment has changed a lot throughout our observation 
period, moving from a period of relative stability in the 1980s to an increasing environmental 
turbulence in the 2000s. Studies on ‘environmental dynamism’, also called ‘environmental 
turbulence’, i.e. the degree and the instability of changes in a firm’s external environment 
(Buganza, Dell’Era, and Verganti, 2009; Luo and Peng, 1999; Simerly and Li, 2000), have 
increasingly suggested that the rapidly macro-environmental changes we have observed over 
the last three decades have made firms sustainable competitive advantage rare and declining 
in duration (D'Aveni, Dagnino, and Smith, 2010; Giachetti, Lampel, and Li Pira, 2017). 
There is growing empirical evidence that the volatility of financial returns is increasing, 
indicating that the volatile component of competitive advantage is higher than the long run 
component of sustainable competitive advantage firms had in the 1970s and 1980s (Thomas 
and D’Aveni, 2009). As noted by D'Aveni, Dagnino, and Smith (2010: 1372) in a review of 
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studies on temporary advantage, “the increasing temporary nature of advantages has been 
attributed to numerous causes, including technological change, globalization, […] 
deregulation, the privatization movement stimulated by governments […], the rise of China, 
India, and other emerging countries, […] terrorism, global political instability, […] etc.” It is 
thus interesting to examine how firms in our sample tackled this turbulence in their external 
environment when entering foreign countries (i.e., which entry mode is more effective when 
the macro environment changes radically and rapidly).  
In order to test whether our results changed over time, first, we had to find a proxy for 
environmental dynamism. We measured macro-environmental dynamism by assuming that 
highly turbulent macro environments were those in the 1990s and 2000s as opposed to the 
1980s (our sampled studies cover entry mode choices from 1980 to 2010). In fact, based on 
what we observed in the extant literature, starting from the 1990s three macro-environmental 
factors have shocked firms’ business environment in most of industries and countries: (1) 
globalization and the related boost to foreign competition (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007; 
Demirbag et al, 2010), (2) deregulations in both developed and developing countries in the 
form of pro-market reforms and liberalizations (e.g., Elango, Dhandapani, and Giachetti, 
2018; Meyer, 2001; Park, Li, and Tse, 2006; Pettus et al., 2009), (3) radical changes in the 
technological environment with the diffusion of digital technologies and the Internet (e.g., 
Bhanji and Oxley, 2013; Oxley and Yeung, 2001). As most of our sampled studies carried 
out longitudinal analysis, for each study we reported the median value of the time window 
analyzed. For example, if the analysis uses data from 1996 to 2000, the ‘median year of the 
study observation period’ for that paper was coded as 1998. If the ‘median year of the study 
observation period’ for a paper was higher than 1990, we assumed the analysis was 
conducted with firms operating in turbulent macro environment. This methodological choice 
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is consistent with other empirical studies examining strategies in turbulent environments 
(Demirbag et al., 2010; Park et al., 2006). 
Next, we tested the effect of environmental dynamism in three ways. First, as shown in 
Table 5, when running the sub-sample analysis, we created five sub-samples based on the 
‘median year of the study observation period’: one sub-sample with observations before 
1990, one sub-sample with observations after 1990, one sub-sample with observations after 
2000, and one sub-sample with observations between 1990 and 2000. As can be observed, 
although all coefficients are positive and significant, the ones related to the post-1990 and 
post-2000 periods are of a lower magnitude, suggesting that high-control entry modes are less 
effective in turbulent macro environments.  
Second, we run meta-analyses for each five-year period from 1980 to 2010, as shown in 
Figure 1. It can be noted a clear negative trend from 1980 to 1995, an increase in the 1995-
2000 period and again a clear negative trend from 1995 to 2010, with a slightly negative 
value (r=-0.002) for the pooled estimate of the period 2005-2010. Also these findings 
suggested that high-control entry modes are less effective in turbulent macro environments. 
Third, we run a cumulative meta-analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein, 
2009), as shown in Figure 2, taking into account the correlation coefficients between entry 
mode degree of control and firm performance (y-axis of Figure 2) in a cumulative way over 
time, starting from studies that used empirical data about entry modes and performance in the 
1980s, to studies using empirical data about more recent entry modes and their performance. 
Essentially, a cumulative meta-analysis served us to depict how the cumulative correlation 
coefficients between entry mode degree of control and firm performance have changed over 
the observation periods used by the sampled studies. We reported the ‘median year of the 
study observation period’ on the x-axis of Figure 2. In cumulative meta-analysis the 
experiments (in our study: test of the entry mode degree of control-performance relationship) 
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are accumulated from the earliest to the latest, where each successive experiment includes a 
synthesis of all previous experiments. This chronological combining of the experiments 
shows if there is a consistency in the results of consecutive experiments and indicate the point 
at which no further experiments are necessary because the results continually lead to a similar 
outcome.8 An extension of cumulative meta-analysis, recursive meta-analysis (Ioannidis et 
al., 1999; Ioannidis & Lau, 2001), allows for detecting turning points in the sequence of the 
cumulative estimates by using the relative change in the magnitude of the effect sizes as each 
piece of evidence is obtained. In our case, if 𝑟!""#$%;! is the pooled Pearson correlation 
coefficient obtained at time t, and 𝑟!""#$%;(!!!)  is the pooled Pearson correlation coefficient 
obtained at time (t-1), the recursive effect size at time t is given by 𝑅𝐶𝑀𝐴! = !!""#$%;!!!""#$%;(!!!)×100. Most of the times such turning points are detected in correspondence with the most 
important studies in terms of size. Figure 2 highlights how the cumulative pooled correlation 
coefficient decreases from 1980, when it was around 0.18, to 1994, when it reached the value 
of 0.00. After 1994, the pooled estimate was at an almost constant level of around 0.02. 
Interestingly, after 1991, correlation coefficients collapsed close to zero. Overall, the 
cumulative meta-analysis suggests a positive relationship between entry mode degree of 
control and performance with larger effect sizes for those studies conducted before the early 
1990s. In the cumulative meta-analysis, the pooled correlation coefficients are always 
significant, except for three studies in correspondence to the bottom of the sequence where 
the pooled correlation coefficient value is exactly zero. Also, these findings seem to suggest 
that overall entry modes with higher control lead to higher performance, even if they show 
                                                
8 Each step of the cumulative meta-analysis considers one more study, and the pooled effect size is recomputed 
in the same way as in the traditional meta-analysis; the only difference is that the effect size is not calculated for 
the whole group of studies at once but is instead recalculated each time a new study is added to the analysis. 
This allows for estimating the contribution of individual studies and the evolution of the magnitude and 
direction of research findings. In our cumulative meta-analysis, articles with the same ‘median year of the study 
observation period’ were entered into the analysis in random order (Gurevitch et al. 2001; Rosenberg et al., 
2000). 
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that the magnitude of the r-statistic is lower for studies using data referring to more recent 
entry mode choices, in particular those conducted with firm-year observations during the 
1990s and 2000s.  
It is worth noting that, after having observed the output of the cumulative meta-analysis, 
we created a sub-sample considering only studies with observation periods after the year 
1991, namely when the correlation coefficients effectively collapsed close to zero. As can be 
observed in the sub-sample 18 of Table 5, after that year we found the magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient to decrease further relative to the sub-sample 17. Furthermore, we 
noticed three turning points (see Figure 2), the first one in mid-1992 (Delios and Beamish, 
2004: 𝑅𝐶𝑀𝐴! = 29.55%, 𝑛 = 27974), the second one in mid-1993 (Gaur and Lu, 2007: 𝑅𝐶𝑀𝐴! = 27.78%, 𝑛 = 9633), and the last one in mid-2001 (Chang and Xu, 2008: 𝑅𝐶𝑀𝐴! = 65.63%, 𝑛 = 241069). 
----------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Implications for Research 
Although a growing literature indicates that the entry mode degree of control is an important 
determinant of firm performance, empirical studies have relied on different theoretical 
perspectives and have provided mixed empirical evidence regarding the performance 
implications of the entry mode degree of control. As recently noted by Brouthers (2013): “In 
general, there appear to be a growing number of studies that explore the performance 
consequences of theoretical mode choice decisions. […] Yet further research is required, 
adding to our knowledge by using better measures of performance, providing theoretical links 
between mode choice and non-financial performance, and using longitudinal data to explore 
how performance effects may change over time” (Brouthers, 2013: pp. 16-17). Likewise, 
Ren, Gray, and Kim (2009) have remarked that results about performance outcomes of entry 
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mode choices are decidedly mixed, and thus further research is needed to understand 
prevailing relationships and contingencies. The purpose of our study was two-fold: first we 
wanted to respond to these specific calls, and in particular shed light on the disagreement 
fueled by ambiguous research findings as regards the general question of whether the best 
performers overall have been those firms using high- or low-control entry modes; second we 
wanted to extend the extant literature by examining contingences of the entry mode-
performance relationship, in particular factors related to the degree of institutional 
development of the host country in which firms operate.  
Our study started from the observation that, in general, scholars assume that firms make 
decisions with the greatest expected return. In the context of our study, this implies that firms 
will select low control entry modes when the expected value of choosing such a mode is 
greater than the expected value of entering a foreign market using a high-control entry mode 
and vice versa. Heterogeneity in entry mode choices – or the level of control – is thus merely 
a result of a mix of firm- and environmental-level factors that enable these firms to better 
exploit the opportunity abroad by using a specific entry mode. With this observation in mind, 
we noted that while some authors have shown entry modes with high degree of control to be 
the most effective strategic choice when firms enter developing countries because allows the 
firm to better solve behavioral uncertainty (Luo, 2001), others have argued that entry modes 
with low degree of control offer the entrant more flexibility and higher performance in the 
context of developing countries because they allow the firm to better cope with 
environmental uncertainty (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). This means that, since both types 
of uncertainty are present in developing countries, firms take entry decisions in the presence 
of opposing theoretical prescriptions. We thus asked which theoretical prescription helps 
firms to reach higher performance in developing countries.  
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Overall, meta-analytic results indicate that the entry mode degree of control–performance 
relationship is positive and significant (Table 5), but the overall Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation coefficient is rather small revealing a weak relationship. However it can be 
considered robust since it resulted almost always significant (and positive) in all the sub-
samples we have considered. Moreover, according to Doucouliagos (2011), meta-analyses in 
economics produce lower overall (partial) correlation coefficients compared to other research 
fields. With respect to the thresholds for ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ correlation 
coefficients for meta-analyses highlighted by Cohen (1988), for a correlation coefficients to 
be considered ‘large’, it has to reach at least 0.50, whereas Doucouliagos (2011) in his 
analysis on a set of meta-analyses on partial correlation coefficients found that this threshold 
is 0.30; as for small correlation coefficients, Cohen (1988) considered values lower than 0.10, 
whereas for Doucouliagos (2011) a small correlation coefficient is under 0.07. 
In our analysis, the sign of the relationship does not change when different types of 
performance are used by the sampled studies (Table 5, sub-samples 1-5), as well as 
regardless of the type of indicator used to measure entry mode degree of control (sub-samples 
6-7). This means that, regardless of the firm’s expected value of choosing an entry mode 
instead of another, best performers are those firms that select high-control entry modes.  
Moreover, when we introduced a moderator capturing whether the entry mode degree of 
control–performance relationship changes depending on the degree of development of the 
host countries, results show that high degree of control entry modes are particularly effective 
when firms enter developing countries (as opposed to firms entering developed countries). 
The prevalence of findings supporting the superior performance advantages offered by entry 
modes with high degree of control suggests that, when firms enter developing countries, 
although they are subject to both behavioral and environmental uncertainty, the benefits 
derived from behavioral uncertainty reduction (obtained by means of higher entry mode 
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degree of control) outweigh the benefits derived from environmental uncertainty reduction 
(obtained by means of lower entry mode degree of control). These findings extend the 
existing literature that takes a transaction cost and institution-based perspective to study entry 
mode choices and their performance outcomes (Brouthers, 2002, and 2013; Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009; Slangen, 2013), by showing that when firms enter environments 
where both the need for foreign partner monitoring and strategic flexibility are needed to 
increase performance, a strategic posture favoring greater foreign partner monitoring (i.e., 
higher control) at the expenses of greater strategic flexibility is more likely to offer greater 
benefits than a strategic posture aimed at the opposite. 
However, in our set of additional analyses we also found that high-control entry modes 
becomes less effective when firms operate in periods characterized by environmental 
turbulence, as in the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, in those periods the global competition 
triggered by globalization, the massive wave of deregulations and the numerous radical 
technological changes running through most of industries made firms competitive advantage 
short in duration, and enhanced the need for firms to continuously reconfigure their resources 
to adapt to the rapidly changing environment, calling for bigger and bigger strategic 
flexibility (Figure 1). These findings, on the one hand, highlight how too high control in entry 
mode strategies may constraint the firm’s ability to react effectively to discontinuities typical 
of turbulent environments. On the other hand, our findings corroborate results of IB studies 
on the institution-based view of strategy that have examined how changes in the institutional 
environment in which MNEs operate represent an important component of environmental 
dynamism (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Rasheed, 2005). In fact, the increasingly turbulent 
environment observed from the early 1990s (triggered by greater foreign competition, 
numerus deregulations and radical technological changes) forced many countries to change 
their institutional environment to adapt to these changes. And this changes in the institutional 
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environments probably created uncertainty in many business sectors, forcing firms to 
reconsider the way they designed their entry strategies (Tseng and Lee, 2010).  
In light of our findings, we expect the theoretical frameworks used to understand the 
performance implications of entry mode choices will likewise have to evolve and become 
more nuanced. To date, most studies on the entry mode–performance relationship have 
employed mono-theoretical lenses such as transaction cost theory, resource-based view, or 
institution-based view. As shown in Table 5, 34 out of 133 studies focused only on TCV, 19 
studies focused only on RBV, 14 provided correlation coefficients between entry mode 
degree of control and performance but did not draw on any theory to explain these 
correlations, while only 16 studies drew on more than one theory. In addition, the decidedly 
mixed findings we observed from our sampled studies remark the importance of examining 
contingencies of the entry mode-performance relationship, possibly by bridging various 
theoretical perspectives. Our recommendation is echoed also by previous studies in the entry 
mode literature. For example, some authors have suggested to bridge transaction cost theory 
with resource-based view: “despite the large number of transaction cost–based studies, there 
is much room for improving our knowledge and application of transaction cost analysis to the 
entry mode choice decision. […] the assumption of the transaction cost view that local firms 
should inherently be treated as potentially opportunistic has been overstated, and the 
resource-based view may help to overcome this limitation” (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007: 
pp. 404–405). Likewise, other authors have suggested that, given the rapidly changing 
environment in which nowadays’ MNEs have to compete, entry mode studies should build 
frameworks by bridging the institution-based view of strategy with the environmental 
dynamism literature: “one needs to understand how institutional factors and the 
environmental dynamics in emerging economies impact on strategic choices […] it seems 
highly unlikely that a single theoretical perspective may be able to explain strategic decisions 
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that are made in these ‘high velocity’ environments, and an integrated approach that brings 
together various theories may be more fruitful” (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 
2005: 11). In fact, whereas each theoretical lens offers a useful perspective, none of them in 
isolation suffices to explain the complex link between entry modes and performance 
(Brouthers, 2002). To shed more light on this issue, our study started from the observation 
that entry mode studies have come out with different empirical findings about the effect of 
entry mode degree of control and firm performance, even those studies drawing on the same 
theoretical lens (as noted in our Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Next, with our Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
we bridged transaction cost view with institution-based view to explain why the entry mode 
degree of control-performance relationship might take different forms (i.e., positive or 
negative) depending on the entrant firm perceived type of uncertainty in developing 
countries. Finally, in light of results we obtained from our set of additional analyses testing 
whether the entry mode degree of control-performance relationships in our sample changed 
over time, we see a further need for future studies offering concurrent tests of multiple 
theories, especially those theories that look at how firm strategy and performance are affected 
by the pace of evolution of environmental conditions over time (e.g., Buganza, Dell’Era, and 
Verganti, 2009; Luo and Peng, 1999; Simerly and Li, 2000). 
6.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Our study is not without limitations that suggest opportunities for future research. First, our 
empirical analyses do not take into account the motives for a firm to entry a host country. For 
example, firms may invest in markets for efficiency reasons, as in locating production in 
optimal locations, or for market-seeking reasons (Dunning, 1998; Powell and Lim, 2017), 
and different motives might lead to different entry modes as well as impact on performance. 
Unfortunately, our research design did not allow us to obtain information (and variables) on 
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motives for entry to use in the meta-analysis and meta-regression. We hope future studies 
could fill this gap with alternative research designs.  
Second, our study considers uncertainty as either present or not present in a country or in 
a certain period, measured with dummy variables, depending whether the country is 
developed or developing. But clearly uncertainty is present in host countries at varying 
degrees (likewise, environmental turbulence manifests at different levels over time). 
However, since most of studies in our sample used multi-country data, we were able to 
include in our meta-regressions only country-level variables related to groups of countries 
(e.g., developed vs. developing), while it was not possible to include single-country-level 
variables like GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, FDI growth, and population growth, 
often used to assess the pace of change in a country macro-economic environment. We thus 
hope future studies could replicate our analyses developing measures of behavioral and 
environmental uncertainty that vary among countries. 
6.3. Managerial Implications 
Our paper also offers some important implications for managers. Our analysis started 
from the observation that when entering developing countries firms have to cope 
simultaneously with the uncertainty related to the risk of opportunistic behaviors by foreign 
partners (i.e., behavioral uncertainty) and with the uncertainty related to the volatility of 
environmental conditions mainly caused by the lack of market-supporting institutions (i.e., 
environmental uncertainty). Scholars have long argued that the risk of opportunistic 
behaviors can be reduced by choosing high-control entry modes, while the uncertainty related 
to the volatile environment can be reduced by low control entry modes. Since both types of 
uncertainty are present in developing countries, should managers expect that the performance 
benefits derived from behavioral uncertainty reduction outweigh those derived from 
environmental uncertainty reduction, or vice versa? Our results suggest that managers 
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entering these countries should have as their primary concern the choice of an entry mode 
type capable of reducing the risk of opportunistic behaviors by foreign partners. This does not 
mean that lower-control entry modes aimed at reducing environmental uncertainty should not 
be taken into account. In fact, in our additional analyses we also found that environmental 
uncertainty is certainly an issue that managers should consider, especially in increasingly 
turbulent environments, like the ones observed in the 1990s and 2000s at the worldwide 
level, scenarios where the strategic flexibility offered by lower-control entry modes becomes 
particularly important for firms in order to timely adapt to the changing environmental 
conditions. In fact, continuing global proliferation of technology and managerial know-how, 
the reorganization of international economic boundaries, and the ongoing emergence of new 
players have resulted in particularly turbulent and complex competitive environment. Such 
environments call for internationalization strategies demanding strategic flexibility in entry 
mode choices, since windows of opportunity are narrower and more transitory, and the 
necessity to redeploy resources invested abroad is likely to emerge. In a scenario like this, 
through strategic flexibility in entry mode choices firms can better cope with the uncertainty 
of competing in an environment where the rules are tacit, frequently changing and typically 
unpredictable.  
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Table 1. Type and measure of entry modes performance in the sample studies for the meta-analysis. 
Performance type Variable measurement Number of studiesa 
Survival Longevity; termination 26 
Financial outcome Return of assets; return on sales, return on equity, cumulative 
abnormal returns  
59 
Market outcome Market share; revenue growth 26 
Overall satisfaction Managerial evaluation of the success of the entry mode strategy 48 
a Some studies used more than one performance measure. 
 
Table 2. Type and measure of entry mode degree of control in the sample studies. 
Entry mode degree of control Variable measurement  Number of studies 
Percentage of equity (EM perc 
equity) 
% of ownership (equity) of the venture in the host 
country: higher % of ownership corresponds to 
higher degree of control 
71 
Entry mode type (EM type)  Dummy variable coded 1 for entry mode with  higher 
degree of control and  0 for entry mode with lower 
degree of control; ordinal variable from low control 
to high control 
65 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entry control–performance (r-statistic) (full 
sample) 
136 0.048 0.112 -0.160 0.386 
Entry control–performance (r-statistic)  
(EM perc equity) 
71 0.064 0.119 -0.110 0.386 
Entry control–performance (r-statistic) (EM 
type) 
65 0.030 0.102 -0.160 0.280 
Developing country 136 0.434 0.497 0 1 
Emerging country 128 0.391 0.490 0 1 
Endogeneity 136 0.243 0.430 0 1 
Theory focus on TCV 136 0.250 0.434 0 1 
Theory focus on RBV 136 0.140 0.348 0 1 
IF 136 2.693 1.534 0 6.704 
Survival 136 0.191 0.395 0 1 
Financial 136 0.434 0.497 0 1 
Market 136 0.191 0.395 0 1 
Satisfaction 136 0.360 0.482 0 1 
Firm age 66 9.308 5.267 1.99 25.860 
Firm size: Micro 79 0.063 0.245 0 1 
Firm size: Small 79 0.228 0.422 0 1 
Firm size: Medium 79 0.291 0.457 0 1 
Firm size: Large 79 0.418 0.496 0 1 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  
1 Entry control–performance (r-statistic)a 1.000                 2 Developing country 0.130 1.000                3 Emerging country 0.132 0.984*** 1.000               
4 Endogeneity 0.139 0.058 0.056 1.000              
5 Theory focus on TCV 0.014 -0.060 -0.069 0.030 1.000             
6 Theory focus on RBV 0.050 0.075 0.091 -0.030 -0.233** 1.000            
7 IF 0.174* 0.039 0.042 0.095 -0.041 0.075 1.000           
8 Survival 0.022 -0.048 -0.083 -0.101 -0.151+ 0.020 0.080 1.000          
9 Financial -0.025 -0.108 -0.105 -0.080 -0.094 0.118 -0.134 -0.199* 1.000         
10 Market -0.054 0.103 0.113 0.205* -0.022 0.128 -0.013 -0.141 0.103 1.000        
11 Satisfaction -0.049 0.116 0.115 -0.032 0.097 -0.170* 0.040 -0.365*** -0.595*** -0.326*** 1.000       
12 Firm age -0.065 -0.239+ -0.323* 0.209+ -0.003 0.025 0.064 0.143 -0.071 0.099 -0.098 1.000      
13 Firm size: Micro -0.016 -0.153 -0.140 0.071 0.079 -0.126 0.086 -0.002 0.103 -0.126 -0.078 0.020 1.000     
14 Firm size: Small -0.192+ -0.054 -0.052 -0.001 0.015 0.122 -0.109 -0.199+ -0.018 0.199+ -0.010 -0.136 -0.141 1.000    
15 Firm size: Medium -0.047 0.147 0.111 -0.150 -0.007 -0.026 0.045 0.370*** -0.302*** -0.097 0.067 0.130 -0.167 -0.348** 1.000   
16 Firm size: Large 0.214+ -0.015 0.016 0.104 -0.045 -0.017 0.008 -0.171 0.242* -0.017 -0.015 -0.033 -0.220 -0.460*** -0.543*** 1.000  
a Full sample. 
Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N = 136 for all correlations except for correlations involving Emerging country, Firm age, and Firm size . 
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Table 5. Meta-analysis results: relationship between entry mode degree of control and firm performance.a 
Sample Condition No. of obs. Pooled estimate  (r-statistic) I
2 
Full - 136 0.045*** 93.8% 
Sub-sample 1 Full without survivalb 110 0.046* 93.3% 
Sub-sample 2 Only survival 18 0.060+ 95% 
  Sub-sample 3 Only financial 38 0.058+ 97.2% 
Sub-sample 4 Only market 10 0.064+ 87.6% 
Sub-sample 5 Only satisfaction 47 0.035* 73.6% 
Sub-sample 6 EM % equity 71 0.058*** 95.0% 
Sub-sample 7 EM type 65 0.032*** 88.5% 
Sub-sample 8 ISI indexed 128 0.044*** 94.0% 
Sub-sample 9 Impact Factor >2 90 0.057*** 95.2% 
Sub-sample 10 Impact Factor < 2 46 0.020+ 84.3% 
Sub-sample 11 Theory focus on TCV 34 0.044*** 87.2% 
Sub-sample 12 Theory focus on RBV 19 0.046*** 88.9% 
Sub-sample 13 No theory at allc 14 0.042*** 86.5% 
Sub-sample 14 At least one theory 122 0.045*** 94.2% 
Sub-sample 15 More than one theory 16 0.126*** 98.6% 
Sub-sample 16 Median year of the study observation periodd <=1990 16 0.058
**  55.2%  
Sub-sample 17 Median year of the study observation periodd >1990 120 0.043
*** 94.4%  
Sub-sample 18 Median year of the study observation periodd >1991 100 0.038
*** 95.0% 
Sub-sample 19 Median year of the study observation periodd >2000 32 0.023
*** 87.1% 
Sub-sample 20 Median year of the study observation periodd >1990 & <=2000 88 0.050
*** 95.3% 
a Some studies used more than one performance measure. 
b The analysis was also repeated deleting observations referring to those studies using survival as a measure of 
performance since some authors have recently suggested a firm survival is not necessarily the result of good 
performance (Ren, Gray, and Kim, 2009). 
c These are for example those studies in which entry mode and/or firm performance were used as control 
variables, and thus no hypothesis was posited on their relationship. 
d Ten of the 136 studies considered in this meta-analysis did not clearly report the observation period when data 
were collected.  
Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6. Meta-regression results: entry mode degree of control and performance depending on the host country. 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
 Sample based on 
entry mode 
measure 
Coeff. SE Coeff SE Coeff. SE 
Intercept Full sample 0.060** 0.020 0.047** 0.020 0.041+ 0.021 
 EM perc equity 0.041 0.031 0.014 0.032 -0.001 0.034 
 EM type 0.070** 0.026 0.058* 0.026 0.056* 0.026 
Developing country Full sample - - 0.039** 0.018 - - 
EM perc equity - - 0.066* 0.029 - - 
 EM type - - 0.039 0.025 - - 
Emerging country Full sample - - - - 0.042* 0.019 
EM perc equity - - - - 0.056+ 0.031 
EM type - - - - 0.047+ 0.026 
Endogeneity Full sample 0.037+ 0.021 0.035+ 0.021 0.041+ 0.021 
 EM perc equity 0.051+ 0.030 0.051+ 0.028 0.068* 0.030 
 EM type 0.011 0.032 0.002 0.032 0.003 0.031 
Financial Full sample -0.019 0.022 -0.017 0.021 -0.010 0.022 
 EM perc equity 0.018 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.044 0.034 
 EM type -0.064* 0.030 -0.071* 0.030 -0.065* 0.030 
Market Full sample -0.023 0.025 -0.030 0.025 -0.029 0.025 
 EM perc equity -0.029 0.042 -0.045 0.041 -0.039 0.042 
 EM type -0.000 0.032 -0.002 0.031 -0.005 0.032 
Satisfaction Full sample -0.033 0.024 -0.039 0.024 -0.039 0.025 
 EM perc equity -0.007 0.038 -0.029 0.038 -0.019 0.042 
 EM type -0.043 0.032 -0.041 0.032 -0.042 0.032 
No. of obs. Full sample 136  136  128  
 EM perc equity 71  71  65  
 EM type 65  65  63  
Adj. R2 Full sample 1.19%  5.23%  6.25%  
 EM perc equity 0.21%  7.35%  10.61%  
 EM type 1.94%  8.00%  8.84%  
F-test Full sample 1.25  1.93+  2.14+  
 EM perc equity 0.88  1.79  2.00+  
 EM type 1.28  1.56  1.63  
Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
SE = standard error. 
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Table 7. Meta-regression results: entry mode degree of control and performance depending on the host country 
(addition of controls firm age and size). 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Sample based  
on entry mode measure 
Coeff. SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Intercept Full sample 0.024 0.038 0.011 0.055 0.005 0.045 0.008 0.056 
 EM perc equity -0.002 0.052 -0.040 0.062 -0.037 0.065 -0.040 0.063 
 EM type 0.060 0.073 0.194 0.168 0.060 0.073 0.196 0.171 
Developing country Full sample 0.079** 0.026 0.045+ 0.026 - - - - 
EM perc equity 0.103** 0.037 0.075+ 0.039 - - - - 
 EM type 0.082+ 0.046 0.040 0.043 - - - - 
Emerging country Full sample - - - - 0.078** 0.029 0.045+ 0.27 
EM perc equity - - - - 0.107* 0.043 0.070+ 0.041 
EM type - - - - 0.082+ 0.046 0.043 0.045 
Endogeneity Full sample 0.008 0.030 0.043 0.029 0.020 0.032 0.044 0.029 
 EM perc equity -0.016 0.042 0.047 0.036 0.007 0.048 0.052 0.036 
 EM type 0.048 0.058 0.019 0.054 0.048 0.058 0.018 0.056 
Financial Full sample -0.020 0.030 -0.015 0.035 -0.014 0.032 -0.010 0.036 
 EM perc equity -0.005 0.043 0.019 0.041 0.016 0.049 0.018 0.042 
 EM type -0.100 0.059 -0.106 0.065 -0.100 0.059 -0.102 0.073 
Market Full sample -0.033 0.037 -0.033 0.037 -0.035 0.038 -0.034 0.038 
 EM perc equity -0.031 0.065 -0.038 0.050 -0.052 0.071 -0.035 0.051 
 EM type 0.017 0.056 -0.034 0.063 0.017 0.056 -0.039 0.065 
Satisfaction Full sample -0.035 0.030 -0.037 0.037 -0.028 0.033 -0.048 0.039 
 EM perc equity -0.059 0.044 -0.033 0.054 -0.053 0.053 -0.056 0.060 
 EM type -0.027 0.048 -0.063 0.063 -0.027 0.048 -0.065 0.066 
Firm age Full sample 0.000 0.002 - - 0.002 0.003 - - 
 EM perc equity 0.002 0.003 - - 0.004 0.004 - - 
 EM type -0.003 0.073 - - -0.003 0.005 - - 
Firm size: Small Full sample - - 0.000 0.056 - - -0.004 0.056 
 EM perc equity - - 0.019 0.067 - - -0.005 0.068 
 EM type - - -0.114 0.164 - - -0.117 0.167 
Firm size: Medium Full sample - - 0.018 0.054 - - 0.024 0.055 
 EM perc equity - - 0.038 0.060 - - 0.039 0.061 
 EM type - - -0.141 0.162 - - -0.142 0.165 
Firm size: Large Full sample - - 0.053 0.050 - - 0.059 0.051 
 EM perc equity - - 0.106+ 0.054 - - 0.111* 0.054 
 EM type - - -0.135 0.161 - - -0.134 0.164 
No. of obs. Full sample 66  79  61  74  
 EM perc equity 37  47  32  44  
 EM type 29  32  29  30  
Adj. R2 Full sample 18.09%  3.96%  15.70%  5.37%  
 EM perc equity 10.41%  6.52%  4.88%  8.48%  
 EM type 12.76%  -9.00%  12.76%  -12.10%  
F-test Full sample 1.95+  1.24  1.63  1.44  
 EM perc equity 1.53  1.64  1.35  1.83  
 EM type 1.14  0.63  1.14  0.55  
Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
SE = standard error. 
Note: the dummy Firm size: Micro was removed and therefore representing the reference value for the other 
size dummies. 
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Fig. 1. Meta analyses of five-year (observation) periods from 1980 to 2010 on the entry mode degree of 
control–firm performance relationship. 
Note: Each histogram represents the pooled estimate for a give five-year period; studies were chronologically 
ordered on the base of ‘median year of the study observation period’. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cumulative meta-analysis on the entry mode degree of control–firm performance relationship (median 
year of the study observation period from 1980 to 2010).  
Note: Ten of the 136 studies considered in this meta-analysis did not clearly report the observation period when 
data were collected. Therefore, the resulting number of observations for this cumulative meta-analysis is 
126.  
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APPENDIX. Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Author(s) Year Journal 
Anand and Delios 1997 Journal of International Business Studies 
Anh et al. 2006 International Business Review  
Barden et al. 2005 Journal of International Business Studies 
Barkema and Vermeulen 1997 Journal of International Business Studies 
Beamish and Kachra 2004 Journal of World Business 
Belderbos and Zou 2009 Journal of International Business Studies  
Belderbos et al. 2014 Strategic Management Journal 
Bradshaw et al. 2004 Journal of Accounting Research 
Brouthers and Xu 2002 Journal of International Business Studies 
Brouthers et al. 2000 British Journal of Management 
Brouthers et al. 2003 Strategic Management Journal 
Brouthers et al. 2008 Journal of Management 
Brouthers et al. 2008 Journal of Management Studies 
Chang and Xu 2008 Strategic Management Journal 
Chang et al. 2013 Strategic Management Journal 
Chen 1999 Journal of World Business 
Chiao et al. 2009 Journal of World Business  
Child 2002 Organization Studies 
Child et al. 2003 Journal of International Business Studies 
Choi et al. 2011 Research Policy  
Chung and Beamish 2010 Organization Science 
Chung and Beamish 2012 Journal of World Business  
Chung et al. 2013 Management International Review 
Colpan and Yoshikawa 2012 Corporate Governance: An International Review 
Cullen et al. 1995 Journal of International Business Studies 
Dai et al. 2013 Journal of International Business Studies  
Delios and Beamish 2001 Academy of Management Journal 
Delios and Beamish 2004 Management International Review 
Delios and Makino 2003 Journal of International Marketing 
Demirbag et al. 2007 International Business Review   
Demirbag et al. 2011 Journal of World Business 
Dikova 2009 International Business Review 
Fey and Beamish 2001 Organization Science 
Fisch and Zschoche 2012 International Business Review  
Gao et al. 2008 Management International Review 
Gaur and Lu 2007 Journal of Management 
Ghahroudi and Hoshino 2007 Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 
Glaister and Buckley 1999 Management International Review 
Gomez and Werner 2004 Journal of Business Research 
Gong 2003 Academy of Management Journal 
Gong et al. 2007 Strategic Management Journal 
Hebert et al. 2005 Organization Science 
Herrmann and Datta  2002 Journal of International Business Studies 
Hsieh et al. 2010 Journal of International Management 
Hutzschenreuter and Voll 2008 Journal of International Business Studies  
Isobe et al. 2000 Academy of Management Journal 
Jiang et al.   2014 Journal of World Business  
Jung et al.  2008 Management International Review 
Kallunki et al.  2001 Management International Review 
Kim and Gray 2008 Management International Review 
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Author(s) Year Journal 
Kim and Park  2002 Management International Review 
Kim et al. 2012 Journal of International Business Studies  
Konopaske et al. 2002 Journal of Business Research 
Kumarasinghe and 
Hoshino 2009 Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
Lee and Beamish 1995 Journal of International Business Studies 
Lee and MacMillan 2008 International Business Review  
Lee and Song  2012 Strategic Management Journal 
Lee et al. 2013 Journal of International Management 
Lee et al. 2014 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 
Li et al. 2009 Strategic Management Journal 
Lu 2002 Journal of International Business Studies 
Lu and Beamish 2006 Journal of Business Venturing  
Lu and Hebert 2005 Journal of Business Research  
Lu and Xu  2006 Journal of Management  
Luo 1997 Organization Science 
Luo 1997 Management International Review 
Luo 1999 Journal of Business Research  
Luo 1999 Journal of Management Studies  
Luo 1999 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
Luo 2001 Administrative Science Quarterly 
Luo 2001 Journal of International Business Studies 
Luo 2002 Journal of Management 
Luo 2002 Organization Science 
Luo 2002 Strategic Management Journal 
Luo 2002 Strategic Management Journal 
Luo 2003 Journal of International Business Studies 
Luo 2006 Human Relations 
Luo and Park 2004 Journal of International Business Studies 
Luo and Park  2001 Strategic Management Journal 
Luo and Peng 1999 Journal of International Business Studies 
Luo and Shenkar 2002 Journal of International Management 
Luo and Zhao 2013 Business Society  
Luo and Zhao 2004 Journal of International Management 
Luo and Han 2009 Journal of World Business 
Ma and Delios 2007 International Business Review 
Magnusson et al. 2009 Journal of International Marketing 
Makino et al. 2007 Strategic Management Journal 
Markides and Ittner 1994 Journal of International Business Studies 
Merchant 2002 Management International Review 
Merchant 2005 Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 
Merchant and Schendel 2000 Strategic Management Journal 
Meschi and Riccio 2008 International Business Review  
Murray et al. 2012 Journal of International Marketing 
O’Brien et al. 2013 Strategic Management Journal 
Ogasavara and Hoshino 2009 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
Pak et al. 2009 International Business Review 
Pan et al. 1999 Journal of International Business Studies 
Pangarkar and Klein 2004 Journal of International Marketing 
Pangarkar and Lim 2003 International Business Review 
Park and Kim 1997 Journal of Business Venturing 
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Author(s) Year Journal 
Peng and Beamish 2013 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
Peng 2012 Journal of International Management 
Pothukuchi et al. 2002 Journal of International Business Studies 
Ramaswamy et al. 1998 International Business Review  
Rasheed 2005 Journal of Small Business Management 
Reddy and Naik 2011 VIKALPA: The Journal for Decision Makers 
Reuer and Miller 1997 Strategic Management Journal 
Reuer  2001 Strategic Management Journal 
Rhee  2008 Asian Business & Management 
Riaz et al.  2014 Journal of World Business  
Sakakibara and Yamawaki 2008 Managerial and Decision Economics 
Schotter and Beamish 2011 International Studies of Management and Organization 
Shaver 1998 Management Science 
Slangen and Hennart 2008 Journal of Management Studies 
Song  2013 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
Steensma and Lyles 2000 Strategic Management Journal 
Steensma et al. 2005 Academy of Management Journal 
Sytse et al. 2006 Strategic Management Journal 
Tang and Rowe 2012 Journal of World Business  
Tong and Reuer 2007 Journal of International Business Studies 
Xu and Lu 2007 Journal of Business Research  
Yoshikawa and Gedajlovic 2002 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
Yoshikawa et al. 2010 Journal of Business Research 
Yu et al. 2009 Academy of Management Journal  
Zahra et al. 2000 Academy of Management Journal 
Zeng et al. 2013 Management International Review 
Zeng et al. 2013 Journal of International Business Studies  
Zhan and Luo 2008 Management International Review 
Zhan et al. 2009 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
Zhang et al. 2006 Journal of Management 
Zhang et al. 2007 Journal of International Business Studies  
Zhao and Luo 2002 Management International Review 
 
 
 
